<p>Your columnist has had a soft spot for countries that briefly rediscover their relevance. It is a peculiar phenomenon when a state, long dismissed as troubled or peripheral, suddenly finds itself indispensable to a crisis it did not create. Pakistan, in recent weeks, has been precisely that. As the Gulf confrontation sharpened, Islamabad emerged as a useful intermediary being one of the few capitals able to speak, however imperfectly, to all sides. Diplomats, never immune to a good story, have been quick to applaud. Even some Indian voices, usually less charitable, have acknowledged Pakistan’s nimbleness.</p><p>This has led to a bout of hand-wringing in New Delhi. Has Islamabad regained strategic relevance? Is this a sign of diplomatic resurgence? Not at all. Moments are not trends. Pakistan’s current prominence is real, but it is also contingent. It arises from geography, history and a certain institutional memory in dealing with great powers. It borders Iran and has ties with Saudi Arabia. Its military establishment retains lines of communication with Washington that civilian governments elsewhere might envy. When crises demand intermediaries, such attributes matter. But usefulness in a crisis is not the same as strength as a state. Pakistan’s external posture may have improved but its internal condition is deeply rotten.</p><p>Consider the economy. Pakistan remains, by any measure, precarious. Its external debt hovers around USD 138bn. It has returned, with fatigued familiarity, cap in hand to the IMF twenty five times, most recently in 2024. Debt servicing consumes over than half of government revenues. Foreign-exchange reserves have rarely provided more than a few months of import cover. These are not the markers of resilience, rather they are symptoms of chronic bungling. More telling, still, is the pattern. Pakistan’s diplomatic relevance has repeatedly translated into financial indulgence. During the cold war, it was American aid, in the 2000s, support tied to the “war on terror”, more recently, Chinese infrastructure lending and Gulf deposits. Each episode has bought time but never delivered reform. States that expect to be rescued rarely behave responsibly. Pakistan’s geopolitical utility ensures that someone, somewhere, will eventually step in. The result is an economy that limps.</p><p>The consequences are visible. Economic growth has been jagged, investment anaemic and productivity stagnant. Nor does the political structure inspire confidence. Power remains heavily concentrated in the military establishment, which exercises influence far beyond the barracks. Civilian governments come and go; but old generals never die – they just keep coming back. Stability of authority has not translated into stability of policy. None of this is altered by a few weeks of diplomatic visibility. Indeed, there is a risk that the current moment reinforces the very habits that have held Pakistan back. Why undertake painful restructuring when strategic importance can be monetised?</p><p>This is why Indian anxiety is misplaced. Pakistan’s ability to insert itself into a regional crisis does not herald a structural comeback. It reflects, rather, the enduring logic of geopolitics that troubled states can still be useful. For policymakers in New Delhi, the appropriate response is neither alarm nor complacency, but perspective. Pakistan’s trajectory will ultimately be determined not by its role in a single crisis, but by its willingness to confront its economic weaknesses. On that count, the evidence remains discouraging. Pakistan is flavour of the month and may even extract some financial breathing room from its newfound relevance. Fame, in geopolitics is fleeting but fundamentals endure. And Pakistan’s fundamentals, including debt, dependence and deferred reform, suggest that this moment, like others before it, will pass more quickly than its admirers expect.</p>
<p>Your columnist has had a soft spot for countries that briefly rediscover their relevance. It is a peculiar phenomenon when a state, long dismissed as troubled or peripheral, suddenly finds itself indispensable to a crisis it did not create. Pakistan, in recent weeks, has been precisely that. As the Gulf confrontation sharpened, Islamabad emerged as a useful intermediary being one of the few capitals able to speak, however imperfectly, to all sides. Diplomats, never immune to a good story, have been quick to applaud. Even some Indian voices, usually less charitable, have acknowledged Pakistan’s nimbleness.</p><p>This has led to a bout of hand-wringing in New Delhi. Has Islamabad regained strategic relevance? Is this a sign of diplomatic resurgence? Not at all. Moments are not trends. Pakistan’s current prominence is real, but it is also contingent. It arises from geography, history and a certain institutional memory in dealing with great powers. It borders Iran and has ties with Saudi Arabia. Its military establishment retains lines of communication with Washington that civilian governments elsewhere might envy. When crises demand intermediaries, such attributes matter. But usefulness in a crisis is not the same as strength as a state. Pakistan’s external posture may have improved but its internal condition is deeply rotten.</p><p>Consider the economy. Pakistan remains, by any measure, precarious. Its external debt hovers around USD 138bn. It has returned, with fatigued familiarity, cap in hand to the IMF twenty five times, most recently in 2024. Debt servicing consumes over than half of government revenues. Foreign-exchange reserves have rarely provided more than a few months of import cover. These are not the markers of resilience, rather they are symptoms of chronic bungling. More telling, still, is the pattern. Pakistan’s diplomatic relevance has repeatedly translated into financial indulgence. During the cold war, it was American aid, in the 2000s, support tied to the “war on terror”, more recently, Chinese infrastructure lending and Gulf deposits. Each episode has bought time but never delivered reform. States that expect to be rescued rarely behave responsibly. Pakistan’s geopolitical utility ensures that someone, somewhere, will eventually step in. The result is an economy that limps.</p><p>The consequences are visible. Economic growth has been jagged, investment anaemic and productivity stagnant. Nor does the political structure inspire confidence. Power remains heavily concentrated in the military establishment, which exercises influence far beyond the barracks. Civilian governments come and go; but old generals never die – they just keep coming back. Stability of authority has not translated into stability of policy. None of this is altered by a few weeks of diplomatic visibility. Indeed, there is a risk that the current moment reinforces the very habits that have held Pakistan back. Why undertake painful restructuring when strategic importance can be monetised?</p><p>This is why Indian anxiety is misplaced. Pakistan’s ability to insert itself into a regional crisis does not herald a structural comeback. It reflects, rather, the enduring logic of geopolitics that troubled states can still be useful. For policymakers in New Delhi, the appropriate response is neither alarm nor complacency, but perspective. Pakistan’s trajectory will ultimately be determined not by its role in a single crisis, but by its willingness to confront its economic weaknesses. On that count, the evidence remains discouraging. Pakistan is flavour of the month and may even extract some financial breathing room from its newfound relevance. Fame, in geopolitics is fleeting but fundamentals endure. And Pakistan’s fundamentals, including debt, dependence and deferred reform, suggest that this moment, like others before it, will pass more quickly than its admirers expect.</p>
